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Abstract
At present, cooperative behavior is mainly in three 
aspects: theoretical research, computer simulation 
and empirical analysis. The basic research paradigm 
including the game method and peer evaluation method. 
This paper research based on multi agent is designed 
and implemented a cooperative bank system based 
on Netlogo platform, in the system to study whether 
the effects of punishment on cooperative behavior. 
Through the Netlogo simulation model and analysis of 
the operation, if there is no social punishment selfish 
people will be more likely to survive. In order to make 
the environment conducive to cooperation, this paper 
establishes the penalty system.
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INTRODUCTION
Cooperative behavior is common to the animal kingdom 
and human society. Cooperation, as an architect of 
the evolutionary process, is the key factor of language 
production (Nowak & Highfield, 2011). It is the greatest 
success of human society, and human society is built 
up on the idea of helping each other (Nowak, 2006). In 
the Darwinian perspective, natural selection does not 
favor and partners. The emergence and development of 
human civilization relies on large-scale cooperation, so 
cooperative behavior to be produced and continue to 
grow and develop has become one of the important issues 
in the field of natural science and social science, many 
scholars also this research. During the 1990s, cooperation 
has become representative issues of decision-making 
psychology. Cooperation is to study on two or more than 
two people or groups to achieve long-term common 
purpose, in resources, knowledge and ability to share in 
order to increase the well-being of each participant of an 
interactive mode (Spekman et al., 1998).
At present, there are three main research directions 
of cooperative behavior at home and abroad. (a) General 
theoretical analysis. Including collaborative modeling 
feature, cooperation stability and cooperative information 
research. (b) Computer simulation. Such as Axelrod 
and Hamilton based on the game theory simulation, 
proposed cooperation and evolution, which is the current 
mainstream research framework. (c) Empirical analysis. 
The reciprocity theory of Trivers that cooperative behavior 
are similar to the investment, the purpose is to get the 
corresponding return to the foreseeable future (Trivers, 
1971). Zahavi (1975) showed that the expensive signal 
theory, cooperative behavior can be regarded as a kind 
of signal, letting the sender to show their type in order to 
improve the social status of Wu et al. (2011) found that 
participants were more likely to reject disadvantageous 
inequality and equality of preferential. According to the 
viewpoint of Weber et al. (1997), the factors that influence 
cooperative behavior can be divided into two categories: 
internal factors and situational factors. The internal 
factors can be divided into two parts of the personality 
factors and cognitive factors, specifically, including self-
2Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Analysis of the Influence of the Penalty on the Cooperative 
Behavior Based on Netlogo Computer Simulation 
efficacy sense of values, emotional states, cognitive 
development level, social cognition and cooperative 
feedback and communication. Situational factors include 
the difficulty of the task, interpersonal relationship, 
information communication and incentive structure. 
According to this classification, this paper is a situational 
factors of cooperative behavior influence research (Weber, 
Kopelman, & Messick, 2004).
The simulation system can realize the cooperation 
behavior simulation with Swarm, Repast, MASON and 
Netlogo. Before the three platforms are very powerful, 
can achieve any model, but more complex and not 
provide auxiliary tools, so the non-professional computer 
users are difficult to use. By comparison, Netlogo has its 
own unique advantages: It can not only realize the basic 
simulation all kinds of complicated social phenomenon, 
but also can provide a friendly interface to ensure easy 
to learn and easy to use. It uses the most advanced all in 
the simulation platform of Logo language programming 
language, natural language is very close to humans, 
researchers can thus help without too much computer 
programming quickly masters the skills so as to realize 
the idea of. The computer simulation is constructed by 
computer model imitating the real situation. The research 
is not easy to direct observation of the characteristics 
and prediction of the future computer simulation 
two Classic applications. Compared to the simple 
scenario of the traditional methods, the simulation 
system can simulate the real situation, but also can 
avoid the influence of subjective factors. The research 
results from the cooperative behavior of computer 
simulation including cooperation mechanism generation, 
cooperative structure, process, cooperation, cooperation 
in large scale autonomous system, the evolution of 
cooperation, negotiation, alliance, cooperation, support 
cooperation in multi-agent deception and trust as 
well as the computer artificial intelligence, software, 
electronic commerce and so on. The simulation system 
can realize the cooperation behavior simulation with 
Swarm, Repast, MASON and Netlogo (Pillot & Morvan, 
2014). Before the three platforms are very powerful, 
can achieve any model, but more complex and not the 
auxiliary tool, so non-professional computer users are 
difficult to apply. In comparison, Netlogo has its own 
unique advantages: It can not only achieve a variety of 
basic complex Simulations of social phenomena, and can 
provide friendly interface to ensure learnability and ease 
of use. It uses the all simulation platform in the most 
advanced programming language Netlogo language, 
very close to the natural language of human beings, so 
it can’t help too much computer programming based 
researchers quickly mastered skills so as to realize the
idea.
Due to the detailed division of labor, the level of 
demand continues to improve, people self-sufficiency 
was gradually weakened, more people need different 
roles to individual people are increasing for their 
attention gradually increased, so the conflict between 
private interests and public interests of the convex. 
of a society to exist, the productive forces must be 
continuously improve the productivity, which will 
inevitably lead to the continuous of the social division 
of labor, and the interdependence between people and 
people, behavior factors material instead of affective 
behavior factors, in which with a private growth 
potential. So the productivity and social cooperation 
seems to be contradictory, which in turn leads to a that 
led to increasing productivity vicious spiral, social 
cooperation, and social cooperation will eventually harm 
the society. Because of their own quality related cost 
and efforts of team members, high-quality group Team 
member’s effort would cost less than the low quality 
of the members of the cost, so the enthusiasm of high-
quality staff cooperation will be higher such as technical 
director of the project than the general technical workers 
cooperation enthusiasm this is in addition to its position, 
the more important is the technical responsible person 
have rich technical experience, and familiarity technical 
knowledge and general technical workers need more 
time to learn to master, so the technical responsible 
person to provide the cost of cooperation than low skilled 
workers, are more willing to help and cooperation so as 
to improve the quality staff and altruistic preferences 
lower quality of staff costs will help to the project team 
cooperation for the others (Ruan et al., 2012).
The multi-agent simulation is used in this paper, 
using the Netlogo simulation software to study whether 
cooperation efforts needed to cost is high, the enthusiasm 
for the team members is also lower. Explore no penalty 
for cooperation and selfish people’s survival, the survival 
condition of adding a penalty after cooperation and selfish, 
draw the simulation results, and the realistic problems to 
make certain guiding activity analysis.
1 .  M O D E L C O N S T R U C T I O N  A N D 
SIMULATION ANALYSIS
1.1 Model Assumptions and Construction
This paper will use a prisoner’s dilemma game to explain 
the evolution of cooperation behavior. In evolutionary 
game theory are two kinds of situations, y of cooperation 
and n of non-cooperative. Cooperation will pay a cost C, 
and to all the people (in addition to themselves) to bring 
the B income (in this paper we will always assume B > C, 
i.e., the cooperation of the benefits outweighs the costs, 
otherwise a cooperation does not make sense). And non-
cooperative haven’t to pay any cost, also do not give each 
other to have any benefit. Payoff matrix as follows is 
shown in the table below:
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Table 1
Whether the Partnership Income Matrix Table
Y N
Y b-c, b-c -c , b
N b, -c 0 , 0
Using Netlogo simulation in the system, and we 
will work together on cost as the cow eats left grass, 
cooperation is the cost of dairy cows to a certain extent 
will not eat the grass, revenue is leaving the grass 
will bring to the whole population of happiness. Non- 
cooperative will not have to cost, because they will eat up 
their grass, nor the population benefits.
In this study the turtle images of cattle, grass 
green tiles. Tiles (grass) on a pink and blue two cattle, 
respectively adopt a cooperative strategy team and take the 
strategy of selfish players, and referred to as cooperation 
and selfishness. They belong to an organization that takes 
the limited resources in order to achieve survival and 
advancement of grass (reproduction) goal. Assuming that 
more grass cattle are more likely to breed, in this sense, 
get more resources are more likely to be promoted. This 
study through the computer simulation of Netlogo, with 
the passage of time, under different conditions to take 
these two strategies the group competes with each other. 
What will the results of each cow place called “tiles”, a 
symbol of unit resource. Each round each cow can eat 
the tiles you are standing on the grass. For once the non- 
cooperative on a tile, they will eat all the grass in the area. 
In the growth partners (grass), but the use of resources 
to a certain extent will have to stop, because once the 
length of the grass is lower than the specified height 
(regeneration threshold). Grass growth speed will slow 
down significantly. Simply speaking, partners will do the 
welfare of the individual, to leave more resources for the 
group (food), on the contrary, for the grass to eat roots, 
regardless of life and death. The whole group definition 
of operational models for cooperation and restrain their 
grazing behavior to stop regeneration, threshold. So 
every time the grass can be a cooperative behavior or 
competitive behavior. To simplify the problem, assume 
that partners have been cooperative behavior, contention 
has been taken for behavior.
1.2 Simulation and Results
Define the partner Y as cooperative-cows, the non-
cooperative N for greedy-cows when the probability of the 
occurrence of the joint authors is 0.5, as shown in Figure 1, 
the 13*13 of the grid in the loop simulation of the world.
We can be seen from Figure 1 to two subjects as much, 
because the probability of our setting is the cooperation of 
the fifty percent, because the moving speed of population 
is not high, at first we can find partners will be more 
conducive to the development of the society, because 
partners are increasing. Through the simulation, you will 
find a special on the situation, that is the beginning of 
cooperation there will be more than the number of selfish, 
and increased rapidly to a peak then began to decline. 
Through repeated experiments found that, beginning the 
initial stage (as Figure 1), selfish groups and cooperation 
will have a short “entanglement” process, and cooperation 
the number has risen sharply. But this process is precisely 
the experimental area set by netlogo began to be occupied 
or development stage, namely resources for people to 
supply does not reach a saturation stage. This paper calls 
the stage is simulation start phase.
Figure 1
Simulation Start Phase
But when a certain period of time, the partners 
reached the peak, but due to the space constraints, the 
partners do not win the selfish, so the partners began 
to decline sharply. With the expansion of the selfish, 
the cooperation of the extinction, the survival of 0, 
and the selfish person does not stop growth to know 
the limit of survival. Due to the grass will continue to 
increase, the number of selfish to some won’t increase. 
We can also be seen, selfishness of the peak is less than 
cooperative. This shows that cooperation can make 
better development of society. As shown in Figure 2, the 
selfish reaches a steady state.
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Figure 2
The Simulation Reaches Steady State
For comparison, we will work together on the initial 
proportional to 70%, after reaching steady state, still the 
final collaborator will all die and leave the selfish steady 
state that in no punishment, it will naturally eliminate 
partners. This is not conducive to the development of 
better society. And because we set the world is the same, so 
cooperation first peak and final selfish balance values were 
within the same range of fluctuations. As shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3
The Proportion of Partners to Improve
2. COOPERATIVE SIMULATION WITH 
PENALTY
In business, in order to prevent losses because of partner 
cheating behaviors, companies need to partner signed 
agreement penalty for breach of contract. So this paper 
also considers the punishment can make the environment 
more conducive to cooperation.
With each other between individuals of the individual, 
and the modeling of the interaction between individual 
and system in the economic and social research, multi-
agent simulation has several advantages: (a) it can be 
aimed at individual modeling, the definition of each 
individual attributes and behavior rules; (b) it can be 
defined between the interaction rules; (c) it can study a 
large number of simple behavioral rules interact with 
each other to form complex phenomenon. And realistic 
social and economic system is consists of a large number 
of heterogeneous individuals, between individuals and 
the formation of diverse and complicated phenomenon. 
Therefore, multi-agent simulation technology is very 
suitable for large-scale social economic system modeling, 
by many research workers of all ages.
We mainly focus on the evolution of cooperation 
in the path of penalty function in society, you must 
explicitly on the evolution process of modeling social 
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subject strategy choice. Individuals may adopt different 
strategies, some do not have some cooperation, some 
do not punish punishment. In each pair, one is altruistic 
side is also defined before us the cooperation; the other 
is a private initiative. Since the party have three action 
choices: cooperation, cooperation and punishment. If 
altruistic cooperation, he will cost C to B. If the passive 
side benefits of selfishness of non-cooperation, both sides 
at no cost and income. If the active side of punishment. 
He will spend the cost of M, the author brings loss to the 
appropriate Q. this paper will survive cost is defined as 
punishment. Because of the degree of difficulty of survival 
cost decides survival. Mainly to study the survival 
difficulty will promote cooperation.
First of all, we will punish set for slight punishment, 
that is to say, the punishment for 30%, when we come 
to the conclusion that the cooperation will still be 
extinct after certain entanglement. Mild punishment is 
still unable to change the fact that natural selection of 
partners (Figure 4) 
Figure 4
Simulation of Cooperative Behavior Under Mild Punishment
We will punishment changed to 60%, then we can 
see the beginning is almost in balance state, cooperative 
and selfish entwined. Gradually the selfish person 
has the upper hand. But after a certain period of time. 
The position of the selfish person is replaced by the 
cooperative. Although there is a reversal in the back of the 
selfish, but did not succeed. The end of all the death of the 
selfish, only the collaborators.
Figure 5
Simulation Results After Increasing Punishment
CONCLUSION
This paper takes Netlogo to simulate the situational 
factors of the last surviving relationship of cooperative 
behavior. Specifically, the task is divided into two 
cases of punishment and no punishment, there may 
be an U curve between cooperative behavior and 
punishment, the punishment is low is not conducive to 
the cooperative behavior, but also relatively high under 
the act of punishment can promote cooperative behavior. 
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Punishment is also high survival difficult, so it can be 
considered acceptable living difficulties can contribute 
to the cooperation and competition. In the absence of 
any inhibition behavior intervention in the condition of 
selfish people easier promotion, no punishment system 
of cooperation in the survival cost disadvantage. Be the 
punishment for the condition of the high, will promote 
people to increase cooperation.
This paper can be extended to the cooperation between 
the enterprises depend on commercial credit environment, 
and supply chain in the core enterprise and general 
enterprise cooperation analysis. Starting from the point of 
view of social welfare, because cooperation created by the 
development of more powerful, apparently cooperation 
is more conducive to the development of society and 
common welfare. Therefore, the promotion of social 
cooperation of tax plans and moral reentrant legal solution 
can improve social welfare.
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